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NOTES

CONTINGENT FEE CONTRACT IN PENNSYLVANIA:
ATTORNEY'S RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
WHEN DISCHARGED WITHOUT CAUSE
Where an attorney has been retained upon a contingent fee contract, and
subsequently is discharged without cause before the litigation for which he was
employed has been completed, what is the measure of his compensation? The
Pennsylvania courts have been inconsistent in their answer to this question. The
purpose of this note is to review the Pennsylvania decisions on this point and to
analyze the inconsistencies. Before attacking the problem presented above, two
questions must be determined: does an attorney have a cause of action against his
client for his fees; and, is a contingent fee contract between attorney and client a
valid one? These questions will be answered in order.
At an early time in Pennsylvania, the law, as brought over from England,
was that an attorney had no cause of action against his client for his fees. In the
case of Mooney v. Lloyd,' the Supreme Court said:
"The connection between counsel and client, in contemplation of
law, is honorable indeed. The counsellor renders his best services, and
trusts to the gratitude of his client for reward. In the language of Blackstone, a counsel can maintain no action for his fees, which are given,
not as (ocatio vel conductio, but as quiddam honorarium;not as a salar
or hire, but as a mere gratuity, which the counsellor cannot demand,
without doing wrong to his reputation."
A short time later this case was overruled by Gray v. Brackenridge,2 to the
expressed satisfaction of Chief Justice Gibson, and since that time there has been
little doubt as to the attorney's right to sue his client for fees.3
The next question to be determined is the validity of a contingent fee contract between attorney and client. The present view is that a contingent fee contract is not illegal. 4 This, apparently, has always been the view in Pennsylvania,
although in the earliest case the author can find, the court seems to have some
doubts as to its propriety. 5 The view also has been subject to criticism by some
earlier authorities in Pennsylvania. Chief Justice Sterrett, in an address before the
class of 1892 of the Dickinson School of Law, commented on the fact that this
mode of practicing law had greatly incteased within several years prior to that
time, and said of such practice:B

1 5 S. & R. 411 (Pa. 1819).
2 2 P. & W. 75 (Pa. 1830).

3 McGahren v. Mosier, 53 Pa. Super. 467 (1913); Sundheim v. Beaver County Bldg. &
Loan Assn., 140 Pa. Super. 529 (1940).
4 Klauder v. Creger, 327 Pa. 1 (1937).
5 Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 W. & S. 315 (Pa. 1843).

6 See Murray's Estate, 2 Dist. Rep. 681, 684 (Pa. 1893).
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"He (the attorney) sinks his high position of attorney into that of
partisan, and, blinded by his greed, presses for a verdict against the justice of the case."
Chief Justice Sharswood also condemned such agreements in his work on
professional ethics.' But the rule is that unless such agreements are formed to accomplish a purpose which is illegal or against public policy, they are valid. 8
The determination of these subordinate questions now brings us to the main
problem of this note. Upon an examination of the cases, of which there are few,
it appears that there are two views in Pennsylvania. The first is that a client may
discharge an attorney at any time and without cause; and, if he does so, the attorney is relegated to a claim for services on a quantum meruit basis. The second
view is that if an attorney is discharged without cause by his client, the client
commits a breach of contract for which the attorney may recover damages. The
difference between the two arises from the interpretation of the character of the
attorney's discharge. In the former view, it is a rightful act; in the latter, a breach
of contract. For the sake of convenience, the first of the two views will be referred to as the quantum meruit theory, and the second as the breach of contract
theory. LDt us examine them separately.
Quantum Meruit
The basis of the quantum meruit theory is the rule that an attorney may be
discharged at any time without cause. Since an attorney may be discharged without cause, the only remedy open to him is a suit for services actually performed,
i. e., a suit on a quantum meruit basis. This remedy should be distinguished
from that in the breach of contract theory. Here it is an action in restitution;
whereas, in the other theory, it is an action on the contract. The reason usually
given for this view is that the relation of attorney and client is one of trust and
confidence, and when that confidence ceases, the relation should cease.
This theory originated in Pennsylvania appellate decisions in three cases decided at the 'nd of the nineteenth century.9 Only in the first of these cases did a
contingent fee contract exist, and although in each case an attorney was discharged without cause, the character of such discharge was not in issue. But there arose
from statements made in these opinions the rule of law that an attorney may be
discharged without cause, and in that event, may sue only for value of services
actually rendered.
In Brightly v.McAleer,1° the first of the cases mentioned above, an attorney was retained to secure a liquor license for his client, his fee being contingent
upon success. Subsequently, the client expressed dissatisfaction with the attorney's
7 Ibid, note 6.
8 Ibid. See note 4, supra.
9 Brightly v. McAleer, 3 Pa. Super. 442 (1897);

Commonwealth v. Terry, 11 Pa. Super. 547 (1899).
10 3 Pa. Super. 442 (1897).

Powers v. Rich, 184 Pa. 325 (1898);
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conduct and discharged him. The attorney brought this action against the client
upon an alleged contract of settlement of his claim for fees. In the meantime,
the client had been refused the license and so defended, in part, on the ground
that the contingency had not occurred and thus the attorney could recover nothing. The attorney objected to the sufficiency of the defense. Although the case
was decided on other grounds, the court stated in the course of its opinion, that
there was nothing in the terms of the contract which prevented the client from
discharging his attorney, and that the attorney certainly could not recover the
whole fee without showing he would have succeeded in obtaining the license. By
the very nature of the case this would have been impossible; and therefore the
most the attorney could have recovered was reasonable value for services he rendered.

The only portion of the court's opinion which would support the theory under discussion is its statement that "there was nothing in the terms of the contract which prevented the client from discharging his attorneys," which raises the
inference that the attorney could be discharged without cause. The other statements of the court can more easily be used to support the breach of contract theory.
In the above situation, the only damages which could be proved on the contract
would be value of services rendered. It is even questionable whether the above
quoted statement can be used as authority for the quantum meruit theory. Was
the court talking about the client's power or his right to discharge the attorney?
Might not it have been talking about the client's power to discharge as distinguished from a case where the client had no such power, i. e., a power of attorney coupled with an interest?
In Powers v. Rich, 1 the second of these cases, the attorney was retained to
accomplish a certain result upon an agreement that he should be compensated
at a reasonable value for the services he rendered. He was discharged without
cause before the result had been accomplished. At the trial the attorney introduced expert testimony as to the reasonable value of services of an attorney, had
he been permitted to complete this contract, on the theory that the client was
guilty of a breach of contract by the discharge, and that this was the measure of
damages. The trial judge admitted this testimony, but later, in his charge instructed the jury that the attorney could collect only the reasonable value of the services he rendered at the time of his discharge. The Supreme Court affirmed the
view of the lower court on this matter with little comment, as will appear in the
following quotation from that opinion:
"On this point there are very respectable authorities that put him
on the same plane as other agents or employees rendering personal service, and allow him full compensation for what he would have earned
had he been permitted to complete his contract. But the learned judge
below ruled otherwise and. . .in the charge he ruled directly and em11

184 Pa. 325 (1898).
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phatically that the plaintiff could recover the value of the services he
actually performed before his discharge."
Here the attorney had received the verdict and the client had appealed. Since
the charge on this point was favorable to the client, it had not been assigned as
error, and consequently the lower court's view as to the law applicable was not in
issue in the appelate review.
In the third case, Commonwealth v. Terry,12 the client had retained an attorney to prosecute a suit. The attorney did so and recovered judgment. This
judgment was assigned to the attorney as security for his fees, the attorney to collect and account to his client any excess over the amount of his fees. The client
then disclaimed, to the judgment debtor, any interest he had in the judgment and
this action was to have the judgment satisfied as to the amount in excess of the
attorney fees. The question of this suit was whether the judgment covered fees
of the attorney after the date of assignment as well as before, the questions of the
legal character of the attorney's discharge and the basis for measuring the attorney's claim not being in issue. But the court commented on these questions, saying:
"The action of the client put an end to the employment of his attorneys and determined the services and expenses to be considered in
fixing the compensation which they were equitably entitled to receive...
(The attorneys) were at once entitled to be paid for the services which
they had rendered."
Thus it may be seen that in none of these cas-es was the theory of the wrongfulness of the discharge of the attorney in issue in the review by the appelate court,
and the views expressed by them may be considered dicta. Nevertheless, the courts
in subsequent cases have seized upon one or more of these cases as the basis for
the quantum meruit theory of recovery.
In Shafer's Estate,1 3 the court said that the client "had an undoubted right
to discharge (the attorneys) at any time without giving reasons," and cited Powers
v. Rich, supra, as authority for this proposition. The court went further, though,
and for the first time the principal reason for this view was given: that the relation of attorney and client should be one of confidence; and when confidence
ceases, the relation should cease.
In the case of Thole v. Martino,14 the client rendered performance by the
attorney impossible. The attorney had been retained on a contingent fee contract but, in this suit, was suing on quantum meruit. The client's defense was that
the contingency had not occurred and therefore the attorney could recover nothing. In substantiating the attorney's remedy, the court said:
12 11 Pa. Super. 547 (1899).
18 39 Pa. Super. 384 (1909).

14 56 Pa. Super. 371 (1914).
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"Having made the performance of the contract impossible by his
own act, in rescinding that contract, he did not leave the plaintiff without an effective remedy.
"There is no suggestion that services were not rendered, nor that
they were not of advantage to the client. . .nor that the amount claimed was excessive or unreasonable: Commonwealth v. Terry ..
"
It may be noted that the question of whether or not the discharge of an attorney on a contingent fee contract is a breach of contract has not been directly in
issue in the cases so far reviewed. The first case on record which dealt directly
with this problem using the quantum meruit theory is Sundheim v. Beaver County
Building and Loan Association." This case was decided in 1940 and may be considered to be the principal case on this view.
Here an attorney was retained as an associate defense counsel in a pending
case. He was to attend the trial, prepare a paper book, and argue the case if ap..
pealed. The agreement was for a contingent fee. In the event of a successful termination of the case, he would receive thirty per cent of the amount for which
the client would be liable. He was later discharged by the client who had informed
him that the case had been discontinued and that he (the client) felt that the
attorney was not entitled to a fee. The attorney brought this action on the contract
for the full contract price, claiming full performance of the contract and a successful conclusion of the litigation. The case for which he had been retained was,
in fact, still pending. The court held that the attorney was not entitled to the full
contract price, saying:
"The contingency stipulated, namely, a 'successful termination' being a condition precedent, the event it had contemplated must happen:...
"Moreover, there was nothing in this contract that prevented the
Association's discharging the appellant. A client may terminate his relation with an attorney at any time, notwithstanding a contract for fees,
but if he does so, thus making the performance of the contract impossible, the attorney is not deprived of his right to recover on a quantum
meruit a proper amount for services which he has rendered: Powers v.
Rich, 184 Pa. 325, . . . ;Brightly v. McAleer, 3 Pa. Sup. Ct. 442; Thole
v. Martino, 56 Pa. Sup. Ct. 371; . . .
One basis for this decision was that the contingency stipulated had not occurred. But the court ignores the rule that where there is a contract to perform
something in the future and performance is wrongfully prevented by the other
party, all that can reasonably be required of a plaintiff is to produce sufficient
evidence, of the best character attainable, of a fair prospect of success.' "
The court, in this case, apparently decided, by the second paragraph of the
above quoted portion of the opinion, that the discharge of the attorney was not
15 140 Pa. Super. 529 (1940).

Is Jaffe v. Alliance Metal Co., Inc., 337 Pa. 449 (1940).
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a breach of contract. But this decision was based upon three cases which have
been reviewed above. It has been shown that not one of these is very strong authority for the point in question. In the Powers case, supra, this view was that of
the lower court and, because it was favorable to the appellant, was accepted by
the appellate court in considering the appellant's argument. As mentioned before, there is only one statement in the Brightly case, supra, which supports this
view, and that statement might easily be construed differently. In Thole v. Martino,
supra, the attorney was suing on quantum meruit, and so the question of whether
his discharge was wrongful was not in issue.
In the last statement of the opinion, the summation or conclusion of the decision, the court states: "The plaintiff, in our judgment was not entitled to recover on his contract, the basis of this suit, but he may have an action on quantum
meruit for damages as a result of a breach of contract." This statement raises
some doubt as to what really is the basis of the attorney's action, and also whether
or not the discharge was a breach of contract. If the discharge was a breach of
contract the attorney could certainly maintain an action on the contract. Therefore, since this was not allowed, the court must have meant an action on quantum
meruit for value of services and not for damages as a result of a breach of contract.
The next and most recent case on this point is Christman Estate,17 wherein
two attorneys were retained by the client on a contingent fee contract to recover
damages which the client incurred during an automobile accident, and proceedings were instituted toward that end. The client subsequently died and his widow,
the administratrix of his estate, settled the claim without the attorneys. The final
account showed a small balance remaining in the decedent's estate, against which
the attorneys claimed for fees. The basis of their claim does not appear, but the
amount of attorney fees on a quantum meruit basis was equal to or more than
the balance remaining in the estate. The court said in regard to the attorneys' claim:
"That settlement terminated (the attorneys') contingent fee agreement and relegated them to a claim for services on quantum meruit. cf.
Annotation, L. R. A. 1917 F, 402, et seq."
Upon an examination of the Annotations of L. R. A. 1917 F, 402, on page
408, the following is stated:
"The majority of courts .... hold that the discharge of an attorney
employed for a specific purpose, before the purpose has been accomplished, is a breach of contract, at least if the services have been substantially rendered, only a small residue remaining to be performed."
Thus it may be seen that these two recent cases, dealing directly with the
problem under consideration, rely upon authorities which, at the most, are not
very substantial. Nevertheless, these cases are the latest appellate court decisions
on this matter and represent the law in Pennsylvania as it stands today.
17 165 Pa. Super. 45 (1949),
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Although the view expressed in these cases is not supported by very strong
authority, as cited therein, there is, however, much merit in it. The relationship
between an attorney and his client is one of a high degree of confidence. It is a
relation at once personal, reciprocal, and confidential. 18 If the client loses his
confidence in the attorney, he should not be required to retain that attorney until
the termination of the litigation. Once the confidence is gone, the qualities of
this relation, as it should be, are also gone. The attorney would not be placed in
an inequitable position. He would be reimbursed for labor and expense. Thus,
this remedy is just and fair to both parties.
Breach of Contract
The basis of the breach of contract theory, as mentioned before, is that the
discharge of the attorney without cause is a breach of contract by the client. Because the client has breached the contract, the attorney may recover any damages
which he has suffered as a result of that breach. If he can show that he would have
been successful, had he been permitted to complete his contract, the damages
would be the agreed fee. If he cannot show this, the damages would be equal to
the value of services rendered.
This theory was first enunciated in Pennsylvania in Williams v. Philadelphia,19 decided in 1904. In this case an attorney discovered, while checking over
some public records, that the city of Philadelphia was making overpayments in
its settlement with the state for taxes. Upon inquiring further, the attorney discovered that credit could be procured from the state in the amount of such overpayments. He approached the city's officials and offered his services to procure
said credit on a contingent fee of 10% of that obtained. The officials agreed to
the offer. He then secured credit in the amount of $32,000, whereupon the city's
officials, deciding that this litigation was against the better interests of the city,
prevented him from proceeding further. At the trial the attorney submitted evidence to show that he could have recovered an additional $84,000. The verdict
was for the attorney in the amount of $8,400. The Supreme Court in its opinion
said that the right of a city as a client to discontinue the litigation was not in
question, but its obligation to tht attorney was a different matter. That depended on the contract. The court treated this as any other contract, and thus the client's
action was a breach. As to damages, the court said that here there was no positive
evidence available, but since performance had been prevented by the client, "all
that can be reasonably required of a plaintiff is to produce to the jury sufficient
evidence of the best character attainable, of a fair prospect of success, and the
compensation which would have followed." The court went on to affirm a charge
given to the jury by the lower court which stated that if the claim were so based
on conjecture and speculation as not to afford a sufficient certainty to the jury's
18 Felix's Estate, 52 D. & C. 37 (Pa. 1945).
19 208 Pa. 282 (1904).
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mind to reach a conclusion, then the jury should resort to the value of the services rendered, disregarding the contingent fee. The judgment was sustained.
The opinion in this case was written by Chief Justice Mitchell. It is very interesting to note that this jurist also wrote the opinion in Powers v. Rich, supra,
a case used to support the quantum meruit theory. The Powers case is not mentioned in his opinion in the Williams case, supra. This fact strengthens the author's opinion, set forth previously in this note, that Mitchell did not intend to
enunciate a rule of law by his statements in the Powers case. Another interesting
note is that the attorneys, in their argument before the Supreme Court in the Williams case, cited many cases from foreign jurisdictions to support their respective
theories, but they did not cite any Pennsylvania cases. Apparently they did not
consider any prior Pennsylvania cases (including the three cases from which the
quantum meruit theory arose2 0) applicable to this situation.
The Williams case was followed shortly by Kent v. Fishblate.2 1 In this case
a husband and wife had become estranged and separated. The wife retained an
attorney to recover from her husband certain property in the amount of $46,000
on a contingent fee agreement of 10% of the amount involved. The wife later
unjustifiedly discharged the attorney who was here suing on the contract. The
verdict was in favor of the attorney. The Supreme Court stated that they were
dealing at arm's length with each other and that, in the absence of fraud, this
contract was "as binding upon the appellant as if it had been between her and
a tradesman. . . .(and) has been the settled rule with us. . ." The court also cited
the Williams case, supra, to support its decision. In the last paragraph of the
opinion, the court said:
"It may be proper to note that it appeared from the testimony that,
before the appellant discharged the appellee, he had procured an offer
of settlement which would practically have given her all she claimed."
These words have sometimes been used to limit the rule of this case to apply
only where the attorney has substantially procured the claim. This factor probably influenced the court's decision, but was by no means the controlling feature.
This conclusion is drawn from the position of these words in this opinion, i. e.,
after the argument supporting the court's conclusion, and the opening words of
this phrase, "It may be proper to note."
The last case which has supported the rule as enunciated in the Williams
case was one decided about the same time as the Sundhiem case, supra, in the
Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania." This case was
not one between an attorney and his client, but by an attorney against a third person for malicious interference with the contract between the attorney and his
20 See note 9, supra.
21 247 Pa. 361 (1915).

22 Bennett v. Sinclair Nay. Co., 33 F Supp. 14 (1940).
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client by inducing the client to settle the case. In laying the grounds for its decision,
the court held that a contingent fee contract was a valid one, and said of such
contract:
"Under the laws of Pennsylvania, an attorney retained on a contingent fee basis has an interest in the contract apart from his mere employment as an attorney. For a breach of such contract the attorney has a cause
of action against his client and may recover the full contingent fee."
The court cited Williams v.Philadelphia,surpra, to support this conclusion.
This, then, repres'ents the second theory in Pennsylvania as to the attorney's
right to compensation in the situation under discussion.
Other Considerations
There are two distinctions which may be drawn in this problem, which the
Pennsylvania courts apparently have not considered. One is the difference between
an attorney retained on a general retainer and one under a contract to accomplish
a specific result. The office of a general retainer is to authorize the attorney to
care for the interests of his client in any litigation which may arise, and to take
all steps necessary to protect these interests.2 8 In such a case there can be no doubt
24
that the client may here discharge his attorney at any time and without cause.
But where the attorney is retained upon a contract to produce a certain result,
it may imply a condition to continue the employment until the termination of
such proceedings. 2 6 In this case there is a specific, terminable contract fairly entered into by the attorney and the client. Might it not be reasonable to protect the
attorney as any other person in such a situation?
Another distinction which may be drawn is that between the power of a
client to discharge his attorney and his right to do so. In law of agency, the principal may have the power but not the right to discharge his agent, and if he exercises this power he will be liable to the agent for breach of the contract of
agency. 2 6 In the case of a general retainer of an attorney, this power and right
seem to coincide. 27 But where there is a specific contract of retainer, do they coincid'e? Under the quantum meruit theory they apparently do, although the court
makes no mention of this. Under the breach of contract theory, they apparently
do not; no mention of this proposition is made here either.
Conclusion
It is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile these two views. They
are mutually exclusive. Though the two latest cases2 8 have held to the quantum
meruit theory, they have not attempted to distinguish, in fact, have not even con28 Kissick v. Hunter, 184 Pa. 174 (1897).
24 MECHEM ON AGENCY, Second Edition, § 2255.
25 Ibid at § 2256.
26 RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY,

§ 450.

27 Annotations, L. R. A. 1917 F, p. 406.

28 Sundheim case, supra; and Cristman case, supra.
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sidered, the cases 29 holding the breach of contract theory. The two views stand
unrepudiated in Pennsylvania law. The quantum meruit theory may be considered the law at the present time because this is the latest view propounded.
The one consideration which the breach of contract theory does not contemplate is that the relation of an attorney and client is one of confidence, and when
that confidence ceases, the relationship should cease. Instead, the courts here proceed with the idea that a contract fairly made between the attorney and his client
dealing at arm's length is as valid and as enforceable as any other contract. Herein
lies the essence of the difference between the two views. Which is more worthy
of recognition is a matter to be decided by our courts in the future.
Clyde E. Carpenter, Jr.
29 Williams case, supra, and Kent case, supra.

